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PROTECTION OF A BUSINESSMAN'S
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Julian Clark Martin* and Jack R. Springgate**
One of a businessman's most valuable assets is his proprietary information. As such, it has traditionally been strenuously
protected by law. However, our laws protecting such information evolved during the early growth of this country, sometimes
at the expense of the rival interests of free competition, mobility
of employees, and liberal circulation of ideas. Presently our
legislative bodies and judiciary are engaged in a re-examination
of these laws to determine if they still properly balance the
public interests. It is the purpose of this Article to discuss for
general practitioners and businessmen the present state of the
law protecting proprietary information, with emphasis on the
law applicable to Louisiana, and to recommend certain actions
a businessman can take to enhance his protection.
The term "proprietary information" for the purposes of this
Article is intended to have the broadest possible scope; it encompasses all ideas, technology and knowledge owned or within the
control of the businessman. There are presently three bodies
of law affording protection in varying degrees to various segments of proprietary information: the federal patent law, the
law of federal and common law copyright, and the law of unfair
competition.
THE FEDERAL PATENT LAW

The most unique and, to the average practitioner, most
mysterious protection a businessman can obtain for certain segments of his proprietary information is that afforded by the
Federal Patent Act. A great portion of the mystery disappears,
however, once the rationale behind the patent system is understood. It is universally agreed that the progress of science is
best promoted by the full and free disclosure and circulation
of ideas. In this way many are able to consider another's theory
or concept and possibly apply it in ways the original inventor
might never have even dreamed. The rationale behind the con* Member of the Bars of Texas and Louisiana; Member, Houston Patent

Law Association; Admitted to practice before the United States Patent
Office.
** Member of the Bars of Texas and Missouri; Member, Houston Patent
Law Association; Admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office.
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stitutional authority1 for patents and Congress' theory throughout
the years in enacting the various patent laws has been that
without the inducement of a limited "monopoly," inventors
would, whenever possible, exploit their inventions by keeping
them secret.2 Under the present Patent Act, Congress has chosen
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by granting
an inventor, his representatives, assigns or successors, the right
to exclude all others from making, using or selling his invention
within the United States for a period of seventeen' years.8
Although Congress possibly could have provided patent protection for all types of proprietary information, it did not choose
to do so. The only portion of proprietary information which may
be patented is that which may be classified as and embodied
in a process, machine, manufacturer, composition of matter, any
improvement of these, 4 a design, 5 or a plant.6 Certain types of
subject matter, some of which may be very valuable to businessmen, traditionally have been determined not to be patentable.
The Patent Office presently will not issue a patent covering
methods of doing business, printed matter, naturally occurring
articles, or scientific principles.7 Whether computer programs
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have power ...
[tio promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for

limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries."
2. In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), the United States Supreme
Court stated the purpose of the Constitutional mandate as follows: "The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and Useful Arts.'"
It has often been pointed out, and equally often ignored by antitrust
protagonists, that the term "monopoly" as used in connection with patents
and copyrights is not the same as the odious monopoly which the founders
of our country had learned to despise in England. The true monopoly
removes something from commerce. "The term monopoly connotes the
giving of an exclusive privilege for buying, selling, working or using a
thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant." On the other
hand, "[an inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before
his discovery." When he is induced to disclose his invention to the public,
he "gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum of
human knowledge." United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
186 (1933).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). The present patent law is the result of the
Patent Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-953, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, enacting
Title 35 of the United States Code.
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 (b) and 101 (1970).
5. Id. § 171.

6. Id. § 161.
7. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 606.03 (a)

cases cited therein.

(3d ed.

1961), and
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shall constitute patentable subject matter has not yet been
resolved. 8
In addition to applying to only certain classes of information, the federal patent law requires that the idea in question
be useful9 and novel.' 0 And, even though novel, the idea must
constitute a sufficient advance over the prior art to warrant
patent protection. For there to be "invention," the idea must
not be obvious when considered in light of the prior art."
Congress has established certain conditions, not unlike prescriptive periods, which, if they occur, will prevent an inventor
from obtaining a patent. 12 The most important of these for the
purposes of this Article is the condition relating to secrecy. Although the invention sought to be patented does not have to be
maintained in secrecy, any patent application thereon must be
filed within one year from the date the invention was first
publicly used or placed on sale in the United States.
The Patent Office functions to determine whether the alleged
8. It has long been held that a process consisting of one or more
"mental steps" Is not patentable subject matter. See, e.g., In re Abrams,
188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). This conclusion is based on the theory that
the patent law is meant to protect only those inventive processes which are
embodied in physical apparatus and not those processes which can be performed mentally. Recently, however, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals has held on several occasions that a computer program constitutes
patentable subject matter. See, e.g., In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A.
1971); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970). These decisions possibly
are a pragmatic realization that unless the inducement of patent protection
is afforded, inventive computer programs will be maintained as trade secrets
rather than freely disclosed to the public. The Patent Office Itself disagreed
with this determination and filed with the United States Supreme Court a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
to review the decision of In re Benson (No. 71-485, October 4, 1971). The
Supreme Court has granted the writ of certiorari, __U.S
(1972).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). Determining what is "useful" (as well as what
constitutes patentable subject matter) requires a delicate balancing of the
public interests. For example, in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966),
it was held that a chemical process which has no known use other than it
produces the intended product or it belongs to a class of compounds which
is the subject of serious scientific investigation, is not "useful." In reaching
this decision the Court rejected the argument that such a chemical process
should be patentable in order to induce chemists not to maintain the process
in secrecy. The Court stated that "if the inventor of a process cannot
himself ascertain a 'use' for that which his process yields, he has every
Incentive to make his invention known to those able to do so." 383 U.S. at
534. Contrary to the Court's conclusions, it has been rumored that, at least
insofar as the competition for the Nobel Prize is concerned, information
of the type Involved in Brenner Is not freely disseminated. See, e.g.,
J. WATSON, THE DOULE HELrX (1969).
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101, and 102 (1970).
11. Id. § 103.
12. ld. §§ 102(b), (c), and (d).
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invention meets all of the statutory tests and conditions. The
Patent Office examines the subject matter of the patent application, searches the relevant classes of the more than three million
existing United States patents, its file of foreign patents, and its
scientific library to determine if the alleged invention described
in the application is useful and new and, if so, whether it is
nonobvious over the prior art found by the Patent Office.
It is surprising how often more than one person recognizes
the need for a certain device or process and, each working
independently of the other, arrives at an almost identical solution or fulfillment of the need. As a result there is often a controversy as to who was the first inventor. Factors which are
considered in determining the first inventor are: when did each
conceive the idea, when was the idea "reduced to practice," and
generally whether each of the persons was duly diligent in carrying the invention from the conception stage to "reduction to
practice."
The document which issues to the first and true inventor if
the determination of patentability is favorably made is referred
to as a Letters Patent. It consists primarily of two portions, the
"specification" and the "claims." The specification describes one
or more embodiments of the invention. The claims define the
metes and bounds of the invention. They point out what the
Patent Office has decided is useful, novel, and nonobvious over
the prior art, and what the public is precluded from making,
selling, or using without the consent of the patentee. Letters
Patent may be analogized to a contract between the inventor
and the sovereign. In consideration of the detailed disclosure to
the public of some new and useful information embodied in a
physical device, the sovereign grants the inventor carefully
defined, exclusive rights for a limited period of time.
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that the issuance
of a patent does not give the owner the absolute authority to
practice the invention. Rather, it merely gives him the right
to exclude others from practicing the invention.' 8 Suppose that
13. The -precise grant contained in a United States Letters Patent provides: "[tihese Letters Patent are to grant unto the said Claimant(s) and
the successors, heirs or assigns of the said Claimant(s) for the term of
Seventeen years from the date of this grant, subject to the payment of
issue fees as provided by Law, the right to exclude others from making,
using or selling the said Invention throughout the United States."
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one invented an improvement to the Polaroid Land Camera
which substantially decreased the distance between the lens and
the film, thereby making the camera more compact. Although a
patent on the invention would allow the inventor to preclude
the Polaroid Corporation from making, using, or selling the
improvement, the chances are that the inventor himself could
not effectually practice his invention because the rest of the
camera would fall within the purview of existing patents owned
by the Polaroid Corporation. 14
Patents are deemed by the Patent Act to have the attributes
of personal property. 15 Except for certain characteristics dictated
by the Patent Act, the property rights in patents are controlled
by the laws of the various states. Thus, the Louisiana laws with
respect to individual and community property, capacity to contract, existence and interpretation of a contract, and inheritance
are applicable to determine ownership of and rights in patents.',
One of the notable exceptions provided by the Patent Act is
that any interest in the patent "shall be assignable in law by
an instrument in writing," and that as against any subsequent
bona fide purchaser or mortgagee the assignment shall be void
unless recorded in the Patent Office within three months from
the date of execution or prior to the subsequent purchase or
mortgage, whichever is later.' 7
The various types of transfers of interests in patents have
been grouped by the courts into "assignments" and "licenses."
An assignment transfers all or part of the title of the patent.
A license is anything less than an assignment. A license may be
14. A practical solution to this apparent stalemate Is cross-licensing
between the parties.
This aspect of the patent system is very important to the promotion
of the progress of science. For fifty cents anyone can obtain a copy of any
patent and use the information it discloses to design around the claimed
invention or conceive an improvement to the invention. The patent system
thus applies pressure to the original inventor to continue to invent and
improve so that he maintains the best product available.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
16. In Pierce v. Luker, 237 So.2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), the court
applied Louisiana law, particularly LA. CIv. CODn art. 1805, to determine
whether a proposed license agreement ever became a binding contract.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970). It should be noted that section 261 also
specifies that a certificate of acknowledgment before a person authorized
to administer oaths "shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of an
assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent or application for patent."
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an exclusive' 8 or a non-exclusive right to make and/or use and/or
sell. A license gives the licensee immunity from suit by the
licensor for the actions covered by the license. Pursuant to
express authority in the Patent Act, an exclusive right in a
patent may be granted to any specified geographical part of the
United States.19 Another peculiarity of patent law is that an
owner of an undivided interest in a patent may, unless contractually bound otherwise, license others fully and without limitation, and he is not accountable to his co-owners for the profits. 2
Applications for Letters Patent must be filed in the name of
the inventor or inventors and the patents issuing therefrom are
owned by the inventor unless he has otherwise disposed of his
rights. 21 An inventor can agree to assign his rights in inventions
made during his employment to his employer and such agreements are generally enforced. 22 In the absence of such an agreement, inventions made by an employee who was not hired to
invent the particular invention are held to be the property
of the employee; an employer is entitled to an assignment of
the employees' rights in an invention only if he can prove that
the purpose of the employment was to make the invention which
23
was in fact made.
To prevent inequities in situations in which an employee
makes, tests, and completes an invention during his employment
using the time, facilities and materials of his employer, the courts
have created for the employer the equitable doctrine of an
implied license to use the invention. 24 This doctrine has become
known as the "shop rights" doctrine. The employer's shop right
is a bare royalty-free, non-exclusive and non-transferable 25 right
and license to use the employee's invention. It does not allow
the employer to otherwise interfere with the employee's enjoyment of his rights in the invention.
18. An exclusive license to make, use and sell is almost tantamount to
an assignment and, for tax purposes, has the same effects as an assignment.
Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).

An exclusive

license

is also

exclusive of the licensor; the licensor loses the right to make, use or sell if
he grants such rights exclusively to another.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
20. Id.

§ 262.

21. Id. §§ 111, 152.
22. Id. § 261.
23. United States v. Dubiller Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
24. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843).
25. Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886), wherein the court recognized
the implied license or shop right but held that it was not transferable to
the employer's successor.
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The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions
26
brought by a patent owner alleging infringement of his patent.
The remedies allowed by the Patent Act are an action at law
for damages27 and a suit in equity for injunctive relief. 28 The
actions are cumulative to the extent that the patent owner may
obtain both damages for past infringement and an injunction
prohibiting future infringement. In addition, in exceptional and
rare circumstances the court may award treble damages. 29 The
questions of patent validity and infringement, as well as the
remedies therefor, 8° are governed by federal law.
THE FEDERAL COPYRIGHT ACT AND

COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT

The Federal Copyright Act s ' was enacted under the same
constitutional mandate as was the Patent Act.3 2 As in the patent
system, the purpose of the Copyright Act is not to reward the
author but instead to secure to the public the general benefits
derived from his labors.8 3 Again, in implementing the constitutional mandate, Congress did not choose to protect all segments
of information included within its term "author's writings."
Congress chose instead to protect by the Copyright Act only the
published34 writings of an author, plus certain limited unpublished writings.8 5 Congress specifically provided that the author
of an unpublished work retains his common law rights therein.86
The Copyright Act does not expressly limit the definition
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)

(1970).

Subsection 1338(a) has generally been

applied only to a suit in which the plaintiff pleads a cause of action
"arising under" the patent laws. If the plaintiff pleads his cause of action

such that it does not arise under the patent laws, but arises under the state
law (such as, a suit for past-due royalties under a license agreement,
rather than a suit for patent infringement), then the federal courts do not
have exclusive jurisdiction. The case may be brought in state court even
though the issues of infringement and validity of the patent may arise. See
Chisum. The Allocation of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts
in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REv. 633 (1971).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1970).
28. Id. § 283.
29. Id. § 284.

30. Superior Testers, Inc. v. Damco Testers, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.
La. 1970).

31. Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-281, ch. 891, 61 Stat. 652, enacting
Title 17 of the United States Code.

32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
34. 17 U.S.C. §§ 8 and 10 (1970).
35. Id.

§ 12.

36. Id. § 2.
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of writings. It does list thirteen types of works definitely within
the purview of that term, including books, periodicals, lectures,
musical compositions, maps, drawings, plastic works, photographs, prints, labels, and motion pictures.3 7 Judicial interpretations of the Copyright Act have determined that a mere idea,
however, is not protectible. The idea must be expressed tangibly.38 And the tangible expression of intellectual creation, to
be protectible by the Copyright Act, must possess at least a
modicum of originality with the author.3 9 Originality must be
distinguished from novelty. Originality means only that the work
was independently created by the author and was not copied
40
from other works.
Publicationof a work occurs when, by consent of the owner
of the work, the original or tangible copies thereof are sold,
leased, given away or otherwise made available to the general
public, or when an authorized offer is made to dispose of the
work in such a manner. 41 The owner of a work may obtain protection under the Copyright Act by publishing the work with
the statutory copyright notice attached to a designated location
on the original and every authorized copy thereof.42 The notice
consists of the word "Copyright," the abbreviation "Copr." or
the symbol @, accompanied by the name of the owner of the
work, and, for certain types of works, the year of first publication.43 An authorized publication of the work without the requisite copyright notice thereon injects the work into the public
37. Id. § 5.
38. See, e.g., Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911)

(moving

pictures depicting principal scenes in Ben Hur held to be copyright infringement).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1970). See, e.g., Chamberlin
v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. A work is deemed to be original and may command copyright protection even if it is substantially similar to a prior work, and thus is not
novel, provided it was not copied from such prior work but rather is a
product of the independent efforts of its author. See, e.g., Wihtol v. Wells,
231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), affl'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940);
TREATISE ON THE LAw

OF LITERARY,

MUSICAL AND

M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT, A

ARTISTIC

PROPERTY,

AND THE

PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 10.1 (1963) (hereinafter cited as NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
41. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 49.

42. 17 U.S.C. § 20 (1970). Placement of the statutory notice is very
critical. In the case of a book or other printed publication, it must be
placed upon Its title page or the page immediately following; in the case
of a periodical, either upon the title page or upon the first full page of text
of each separate number or under the title heading; in the case of a musical
work, either upon the title page or the first page of music.
43. Id. § 19. The year is required only if the work is a printed literary,
musical or dramatic work.
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domain and the owner is precluded from later registering it."
Thus, the term publication becomes extremely important and,
as one would surmise, has grown to be a legal doctrine in itself,
45
replete with numerous exceptions and variations.
In order to maintain an action for infringement of the
copyright, the owner must register the work with the Copyright
Office and deposit therein two copies of the work. 46 It is important to realize that registration of a published work does not
create the copyright; it is merely a procedural step which records
the copyright. The copyright was created upon publication with
correct notice.
The term of copyright protection is twenty-eight years from
the date of first publication, not the date of registration. In the
twenty-eighth year, the copyright may be renewed by certain
persons for an additional twenty-eight years. 47 Upon the expiration of the second term, the work passes into the public domain.
An action for infringement of a registered copyright must
be brought in federal court. 48 Under the Copyright Act, the owner
of the copyright is entitled to the following remedies against
an infringer: injunction, damages and profits, impounding of the
infringing work pending the action, and destruction of the
infringing work after completion of the action. 49 Additionally,
the statute provides for the recovery of full costs and attorney's
fees." Infringement means that someone other than the copyright
owner is exercising some right granted by the statute exclusively
to the copyright owner. The infringement situation is complicated
somewhat because the rights granted the copyright owner by
44. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
45. See NIMMER
46. 17 U.S.C. §

§ 49.
provides

ON COPYRIGHT

13

(1970)

that:

"After copyright

has

been

secured by publication of the work with the notice of copyright as provided
in . . . this title, there shall be promptly deposited ....
" the required copies
and claim of copyright in the Copyright Office. However, the Supreme Court
held in Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939), that the
words "promptly deposited" may not be read as a condition subsequent
which, if not satisfied, would result in destruction of the copyright. Therefore, registration of the work and the copyright is a requisite only to
an infringement action under 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
Interestingly, 17 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides that the Postmaster shall
mail the articles being deposited free of cost to the copyright claimant.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). See text accompanying note 61 infra.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
50. Id. § 116.
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the statute vary depending upon the type of work involved.
Irrespective of the type work involved, however, the copyright
owner has the exclusive right to print, reprint, publish, copy,
and vend the copyrighted work.r"
Existing concomitantly with the Federal Copyright Act is
the so-called "common law copyright." This creature of the common law of the various states recognizes that property status,
and thus some protection, should be afforded the fruits of intellectual labor.5 2 To be entitled to protection under the doctrine
of common law copyright, the author's work must be the un8 expression of an original
published5
idea. Common law copyright protects such an unpublished work from the moment of
its creation without the need to observe any formalities. The
moment the work is "published" the common law copyright is
lost. If the statutory formalities are observed at the moment of
publication, the common law copyright is replaced with the statutory copyright. But if not, the work is passed into the public
domain.
The owner of a work generally has somewhat greater rights
under the common law copyright than under the statutory
copyright,54 but of course his work is unpublished and he probably is not receiving any monetary reward. For instance, types
of works not protected by the Copyright Act are often protected
in unpublished form by the common law copyright. And the
rights afforded by the common law copyright are not limited depending upon the type of the work. The owner of a work protected by common law copyright has the same type action against
the infringer existing for other injuries to personal property. He
may recover damages, injunctive relief and such other equitable
relief as the court is empowered to grant. In the absence of a
state statute or contractual provision, he may not recover attorney's fees.
The author who has not sold or otherwise alienated the
51. Id. § 1.
52. The common law copyright is actually a recognition by the various
state courts that it is an act of unfair competition for one to print, publish,
copy, vend or perform an author's unpublished work without his consent.

17 U.S.C. § 2 expressly provides that the act shall not be construed or limit
the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common
law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication or use of such unpublished work without his consent and to obtain damages therefor.
53. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
54. See, e.g., NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 111.
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rights in his work will own the common law copyright on his
work and the right to obtain the statutory copyright thereon. 5
Unlike the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that either
the author or the proprietor of the work may obtain the statutory
copyright. 56 Thus, the author may assign his work to another
who may then publish it and obtain the federal registration.
Even more dissimilar to the Patent Act, the Copyright Act
defines "author" to include an employer in the case of "works
made for hire." 57 There has been no need for the development
of an equitable doctrine similar to the patent system's "shop
right" doctrine because, if the employer/author relationship
is such that the work was made for hire, the employer is deemed
to be the author of the work. The employer thus owns all rights
in the work rather than simply having an equitable right to use
the work. On the other hand, if the work was not created as a
part of the author's duties to his employer, the work remains
the property of the author58 and, in the absence of an express
agreement, the employer acquires no rights therein.5 9 The critical
question in determining whether the work was made for hire
is whether the employment relationship exists between the employer and the author; more particularly, whether the employer
has the right to control the manner of work being performed
by the author. The manner of payment for the work has no
pronounced effect on this determination. 0
The renewal provisions of the Copyright Act in certain
instances limit the right to renew the statutory copyright to
the author, his heirs, executor or next of kin."' If the author
is dead, the proprietor of the copyrighted work may not renew
the copyright even if the right to renew the work had been
assigned to him. Thus, it is especially important for an employer
to be considered the author of the work.
Copyrights, both common law and statutory, are property
55. 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1970).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 26.
58. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.
1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962); United States v.
First Trust Co., 251 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1958).
59. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569
(2d Cir. 1955); Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Hyde, 75 N.W. 781 (N.D. 1898).
60. Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d
639 (2d Cir. 1967).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). The statute was enacted to protect the families
of authors who had made bad bargains with publishers.
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rights. Similar to patents, the validity and infringement of a
statutory copyright, and the remedies therefor, are governed
by federal law. Actions for infringement of common law copyright are governed by the laws of the various states. With certain
exceptions delineated by the Federal Copyright Act, such as
the public record requirement for assignment of statutory copyright, 2 both the common law and statutory copyrights are subject to the laws of the various states on contracts, sale, mort03
gage, inheritance and community property.
THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
The law of unfair competition is an amorphous, dynamic
body of law stemming generally from the common law of the
separate states."4 It has been developed over the years by the
courts' concluding on a case-by-case basis what practices are
contrary to ordinary business ethics. As such, the law of unfair
competition is continually changing to reflect the social and
economic climate.
Actions which in other states have been held to amount to
unfair competion include making false and/or misleading advertising, disparaging a competitor's property or reputation,
bribing employees of customers and prospective customers, and
inducing another to breach a contract. 65 Long considered to be
an act of unfair competion is "palming-off" one's goods or services for those of his competitors. This may be accomplished by
simulation of shape, design, method of operation, labeling, or
otherwise. The law relating to trade names, trademarks, and
service marks, derived from the much older prohibition against
palming-off, is also a part of the law of unfair competition."6
62. Id. § 30.
63. See, e.g., id. §§ 27 and 28.

64. A plaintiff may bring his unfair competition action in federal court
if he can establish diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), or if the

claim may be joined with a substantial and related claim under the patent,
copyright or trademark laws. Id. § 1338(b). In either case, it is generally
held that state law is applicable to the unfair competition question.
Additionally, sections 43(a) and 44(h) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-1051 (1970)) create a federal cause of action of unfair competition in
certain limited situations. The federal courts have jurisdiction over an
unfair competition action brought under either of these sections without
regard to diversity of citizenship or a pendent claim and have been using
these sections to create a federal law of unfair competition.
65. See note 127 infra for a contrary holding in Louisiana.
66. The trade name and trademark facet of the law of unfair competition is unique in that Congress and the various States have enacted legis-
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These activities constituting acts of unfair competition, although
extremely important to a businessman wishing to protect his
good will and success, do not generally concern proprietary information, and are not within the scope of this Article.
Misappropriationof Information
Also considered a part of the law of unfair competition are
the protections afforded a businessman against the unlawful
exploitation of his labors and the misappropriation of his proprietary information. The landmark decision establishing protection against the unlawful exploitation of one's labors was
InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press.67 Both plaintiff
and defendant in the INS case were engaged in a business of
gathering and distributing news. The defendant was augmenting
its news service by gathering portions of its news from the
early editions of plaintiff's newspapers. The plaintiff charged
that the defendant was systematically pirating the fruit of its
efforts. The defendant responded that all property rights in the
uncopyrighted news were lost after publication and thus could
be used by anyone. The United States Supreme Court declined
to pass upon the questions whether there is any property right
in news matter at common law or whether the federal Copyright Act was applicable. Instead it decided the case solely on
the theory of unfair competition in business. The Court stated:
"[D]efendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking
material that has been acquired by complainant as the result
of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and
money, and which is salable by complainant for money, and
that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its
own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by
disposing of it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating to itself the harvest of
those who have sown. Stripped of all disguises, the process
amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal
operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at
the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert
lation providing detailed rights and remedies augmenting the common law.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-1051 (1970) (Lanham Act); LA. R.S. 51:211-288 (Supp.
1968). Also, the law of trade names and trademarks does not require that
the parties involved be competitors.
67. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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a material portion of the profit from those who have earned
it to those who have not; with special advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not
burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the news.
The transaction speaks for itself, and a court of equity ought
not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition in business."0' 8 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Court appeared to create a new competitive tort,
often summarized as "reaping where one has not sown."
The doctrine advanced by the majority of the Court in INS
was severely undercut by the persuasive dissent of Justice
Brandeis. The dissent argued that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truth ascertained, conceptions and ideasbecome, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air
to common use. Only in certain classes of cases where public
policy has seemed to demand it does the attribute of property
continue after publication. These exceptions are confined to productions which, in some degree, involve creation, invention or
discovery. Justice Brandeis argued that a businessman has no
absolute right to the protection of his labors, such as the
news, not belonging to those exceptions, but merely the qualified
right to be protected as against the defendant's acts because
of the special relation in which the defendant stands or the
wrongful method or means employed in acquiring the knowledge
or manner in which it is used. In such cases protection is afforded
based upon a theory of breach of contract or trust or upon unfair
competition.
From the date the INS decision was rendered, the courts
have steadily receded from the broad position of the majority
to the position advanced by Justice Brandeis. The most recent
recessions from INS are the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.69 and Compco
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.70 The question presented in both cases
was whether a state's unfair competition law can, consistent
with the policy of federal law, impose liability for or prohibit
the copying of an article which is protected by neither a federal
patent nor a federal copyright. In Sears the plaintiff, Stiffel,
68. Id. at 239-40.
69. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
70. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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had obtained utility and design patents on a pole lamp, which
proved to be a decided commercial success. 71 Sears soon thereafter put on the market a substantially identical, but less expensive, pole lamp. Stiffel sued Sears in federal court claiming in
its first count that Sears infringed Stiffel's patents, and, in its
second count, that by selling copies of Stiffel's lamp, Sears had
caused confusion in the trade as to the source of the lamps and
had thereby engaged in unfair competition under Illinois law.
The trial court and the court of appeals found Stiffel's patents
to be invalid but, since a likelihood of confusion was established
(there was no showing of palming-off), Sears was enjoined from
unfair competition and ordered to account for profits and damages. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
this use of a state's law of unfair competition is incompatible
with the Federal Patent Act.
Examining the constitutional authority for patents and copyrights and the legislation enacted pursuant to such authority,
the Court stated:
"[T]he patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the
same time preserving free competition. Obviously a State
could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration
date or give a patent on an article which lacked the level
of invention required for federal patents. To do either would
run counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents
only to true inventions, and then only for a limited time.
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws
directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that
72
clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.
Concerning the question of likelihood of confusion, the Court
stated that mere inability of the public to tell two identical
articles apart is not enough to support an injunction against
copying or an award of damages for copying that which the
Federal Patent Act permits to be copied. Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent, copyright, or trade71. The facts of the G.ompco decision are similar and will not be discussed.

72. 376 U.S.225, 230-31 (1964).
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mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all. Thus it was
held that Sears had a right under the federal patent system
to copy Stiffel's design and sell lamps identical to those sold
by Stiffel.
Importantly though, the Court asserted that a state may,
in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps
be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the
source. The Court also asserted that a state may continue to
protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others,
by imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to
the source of the goods.
The Sears decision and its companion case, Compco, have
had and are continuing to have a profound effect upon the laws
protecting proprietary information. To the extent that INS afforded a remedy for mere copying, it is no longer authoritative. 73
Clearly Sears and Compco give one the right to copy the functional portions on an unpatented and uncopyrighted product. 74
Although the question is much closer if one copies the nonfunctional elements of his competitor's product, if these nonfunctional
components have not acquired a secondary meaning, the copying
definitely should be lawful under Sears and Compco. And even
if the nonfunctional elements have obtained secondary meaning,
if the products being produced in imitation of the competitor's
products are conspicuously marked so there is no confusion to
the public, the copying should be lawful.73
Other than for mere copying, however, the remainder of
73. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315
(1st Cir. 1967). The court in DeCosta stated that INS was no longer authoritative for at least two reasons: INS was decided as a matter of general
federal law before the decision In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) and, since INS prohibited the copying of published written material
that had not been copyrighted, It has clearly been overruled by Sears and
Compco. In DeCosta It appeared that CBS had slavishly copied DeCosta's
stage name "Paladin," his style, his symbol (the Knight chess piece) and
his calling card ("Have Gun Will Travel, Wire Paladin, North Court Street,
Cranston, Rhode Island") for its television program. However, it was held
that under the Bears and Compco doctrine CBS was not liable because
DeCosta had no rights in his performance, and his cards, which were copyrightable, had been published without securing copyright thereon. See also
Riback Enterprises, Inc. v. Denham, 452 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1971).
74. Price Food Co. v. Good Foods, Inc., 400 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1968).
75. Tappan Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1967).
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the law of unfair competition dealing with unlawful exploitation
of one's labors and proprietary information has not been eroded
by Sears and Compco. It has been recognized by the courts that
while a manufacturer can copy an unpatented or uncopyrighted
product, he cannot market his product in a way which he knows
will induce purchasers to buy it thinking it is the product of
another. Thus, palming-off' 0 and material misrepresentation in
advertising" have been held to be still actionable torts. Additionally, all other actions previously considered to constitute
unfair competition which involve more than mere copying of
one's products should not be affected by Sears and Compco.75
Secret Information
Another segment of the law of unfair competition is comprised of the protection afforded secret information. These protections evidence a realization, principally by the judiciary
76. See, e.g., Riback Enterprises, Inc. v. Denham, 452 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1971); K-S-S Plastics, Inc. v. Carolite, Inc., 408 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1969); Heaton
Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1967).
77. Electronics Corp. of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 428 F.2d 191 (1st
Cir. 1970).
78. The "record piracy" cases clearly indicate the reluctance of the
courts to give Sears and Compco a pervasive application. Prior to February
15, 1972, the sounds incorporated in records (as distinguished from the
labels) were not copyrightable. Certain enterprising businessmen began
pirating and selling the sounds from published records. The courts clearly
considered these activities to be acts of unfair competition and thus were
challenged to devise means of protecting the record owner. The theory
seized upon by most courts was that the pirate did not merely copy and
imitate the product, but rather actually took and appropriated the product.
Under this view, INS was controlling rather than Sears and Compco. See,
e.g., Tape Industries Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D.
Cal. 1970); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 264 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
1970); Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d
414, writ denied, 278 N.C. 702, 181 S.E.2d 600 (1971); Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Greatest Records, Inc., 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1964).
Pub. L. 92-140 (Oct. 15, 1971) has now provided copyright protection
for certain sound recordings fixed and first published after February 15,
1972. The courts will probably hold that since Congress has seen fit to provide
copyright protection, the record owner must copyright his sounds In order
to protect them. Publishing the sounds without securing statutory copyright
will probably inject them into the public domain.
The Supreme Court has recently granted a writ of certiorari (No. 711192) in a case in which the petitioners were convicted under California's
record piracy criminal statute for appropriating sounds from a recording
fixed and first published prior to February 15, 1972. Goldstein v. California,
.. U.S.-. (1972). In reviewing this case, the Court probably will consider
whether state statutes and doctrines of unfair competition granting a form
of copyright protection to published sound recordings conflict with U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and the implementing Federal Copyright Act. In
all probability the Court will hold that the rationale of Sears, rather than
INS, Is controlling, and that uncopyrighted records may be freely copied
once they are published (whether before or after February 15, 1972).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

but to some extent by the legislative bodies, that so-called
"trade secrets" and confidential information are of great value
to their owners. Since such information is also of great value to
the public, the patent and copyright acts are designed to induce
the owners to disclose their ideas. But the vast majority of
proprietary secret information does not meet the exacting standards of the patent system or is not copyrightable or, even if
patentable or copyrightable, the proprietor does not wish to take
a chance on losing the information by obtaining a patent or
copyright. For lack of a better solution, the law has evolved
certain protections, based partially on tort concepts, partially on
property concepts, substantially on contract concepts and vastly
on equitable concepts, for a businessman's secret information
which allow him to conduct his business free from reprehensible business tactics.7 9
Possibly the most difficult aspect of this area of the law
is determining what proprietary information is protectible. Most
states provide protection to any information which meets the
Restatement of the Law of Torts' definition of "trade secret":
"A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It
may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers ....

A

trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the
operation of the business. Generally it relates to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for
the production of an article. It may, however, relate to the
sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as
a code for determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of specialized cus79. Under the constricting rationale of Sears and Compco, state laws
designed to'protect trade secrets and confidential Information cannot be
based on the policy of rewarding or otherwise encouraging the development of secret processes or devices. This is the policy of the Federal Patent
and Copyright Acts. Therefore, It is said that the protection is merely
against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secrets.
See, e.g., Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 171 (5th
Cir. 1969); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350
F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
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tomers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office management."'
(Emphasis added.)
No attempt here will be made to enumerate the various types
of proprietary information that have at one time or another
been held to constitute protectible secret information. Several
treatises are available which delve into the subject in detail.-8 '
It is suggested that all proprietary information which is secret
and confidential and gives its owner an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over his competitors should be protectible. 82
In any event, the threshold issue in each case of this nature
is whether the information in question was in fact secret. Matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry
cannot be appropriated by one as his secret. Matters which are
completely disclosed by the businessman's marketed products
cannot be his secret. On the other hand, a secret clearly need
not be absolute to be protectible. The degree of secrecy required
for the protection of the information is a matter of judgment
and will vary from case to case. Some factors which the courts
have generally considered in determining whether given information is a secret are: the extent to which the information is
known outside of the owner's business; the extent to which it
is known by the owner's employees and others involved in his
business; the extent of the measures taken by the owner to
guard the secrecy of his information; the value of the information to the entrepreneur and to his competitors; the amount of
effort or money expended by him in developing the information; and the ease or difficulty with which the information could
be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 83
Once it has been determined that there exists proprietary
80. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
81. See, e.g., R.

CALLMANN,

THE LAw 01" UNFAIR COMPETITION,

TRADEMARKS

AND MONOPOLIES (3d ed. 1967); R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS (1953); and 12 Business
Organizations, R. MiLORIm, TRADE SECRETS (1971).

82. See, e.g., Clark v. Bunker, __F.2d_ (9th Cir. 1972), holding that no
category of information is excluded from protection as a trade secret
because of its inherent qualities. Thus, plaintiff's detailed plan for the creation, promotion, financing and sale of contracts for prepaid funeral services
gave its users a marked advantage over their competitors and was a
protectible trade secret. The court held that novelty is not a requirement
for a trade secret. The fact that the information could have been obtained
elsewhere is not critical since it would have required substantial effort.
The fact that the plan had been disclosed to others did not destroy the
trade secret status since the others had held it secret.
83. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

information which may constitute protectible subject matter and
such proprietary information is secret to the necessary degree,
the court will consider fashioning some rationale for protecting
the secret information. Often it is said that the businessman has
a property right in his secret information. 4 The property concept
is significant since the information must have some independent
value in order to be protected. But it must be realized that this
property right is not in rem and is not like the property right
in other chattels. The owner of the secret information is protected only against its appropriation or use without his consent.
If another obtains the information honestly, such as by reverse
engineering the product or by discovering or conceiving the
information independently, then the owner of the secret has no
cause of action-and quite possibly all rights in the secret information have been lost because the information is no longer secret.
An alternative approach is to base the protection on the
principles of either contract or confidence. The theory of founding recovery on contract or trust and confidence is generally
thought to have arisen from the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
in E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland 5 in which
he stated:
"The word property as applied to . . . trade secrets is an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences
of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary
requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any
valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted.
The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be.
Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not the
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood
in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them."
In allowing recovery against one who has appropriated or
used the secret information without the consent of the owner,
the courts of the various states generally choose among the
84. "The inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is
his absolute property. He may withhold the knowledge of it from the
public . . . ." (Emphasis added.) United States v. American Bell Telephone
Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897). "We are dealing with a type of intellectual
property-in effect, a property right in discovered knowledge." (Emphasis
added.) Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 922
(7th Cir. 1953).
85. 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
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property, contract, or confidence theories depending upon the
relationship between the owner of the secret information and
the alleged infringer. Absent a relationship of contract or confidence, the owner must rely on his naked absolute property
right in the secret information and protection is afforded him
against one who appropriates the secret by unfair tactics on
classical principles of unfair competition. 8 But if there exists
a contractual or confidential relationship between the owner of
the secret and the party who improperly disclosed or used it,
the owner has an action based on breach of contract or breach
of confidence. Regardless of the theory chosen, however, simply
because the proprietary information happens to be secret and
someone else turns up with it is not sufficient. That other party
must have acquired the information unfairly or tortiously or in
breach of a contractual or confidential relationship.8 7
If there is a contractual or confidential relationship between
the parties, the election of the court to afford protection to the
businessman's secret information under the theory of breach of
an express or implied contract, on the one hand, or under the
theory of breach of confidence, on the other hand, can be very
important. For instance, a different period of limitations may be
applicable depending upon whether the activity is deemed to be
a breach of an implied contract or a breach of a confidential
relationship.8 8
The most common relationship of the parties in trade secret
litigation is that of employer and employee. The ownership of
secret information in an employment relationship depends upon
whether the information was developed by the employee along
his line of duty. The employer owns and has the right to keep to
himself the work which he has done or paid for doing.8 9 On the
other hand, all information which an employee brings with him
to his employment is free of ownership by the employer in the
absence of an agreement purchasing such information. 90
86. See, e.g., the INS decision and text discussed at note 67 supra.
87. See Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 23 N.E. 1968 (1890), where
Judge (later Justice) Holmes held that the only right the owner of secret
formulae had was to prevent anyone from obtaining and using them through
a breach of trust or contract.
88. In Louisiana, if deemed to be a breach of confidence, the action
will probably be considered one ex delicto and prescribe in one year. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3536. But if deemed to be a breach of contract or implied contract, the action will probably prescribe in ten years. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3544.
89. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
90. Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923).
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It is well settled at common law that the existence of the
employment relationship imposes a duty upon the employee not
to use or disclose any of his employer's confidential information
which the employee knew was to be treated as confidential.
Whether the employer intended to maintain the information in
confidence may be implied from the employer's course of conduct
or it may be shown by express agreement.9 1 The obligation of
the employee to protect his employer's secret information extends throughout his employment and continues after such employment is terminated.9 2 This obligation extends to all employees having knowledge of the trade secret and not just those
who are hired to develop such information.9 3 Other persons who
have been held to be obligated as a result of their relationship
to maintain the confidential nature of another's secret information are former joint venturers, former partners, officers of a
corporation, the prior owner of a business, and attorneys.9 4 On
the other hand, no protection is afforded the owner of secret
information with respect to those persons with whom he has
no contractual or confidential relationship, such as visitors to a
plant."5 Usually a contractual or confidential obligation not to
use or disclose secret information terminates with the publication or loss of confidentiality of the information.9 6
The remedies available to a trade secret owner at common
law include injunctive relief, damages from both the disloyal
91. Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935).
92. A. H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prod. Corp., 268 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. N.Y.
1967); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
93. Rubner v. Gursky, 21 N.Y.S.2d 558 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1940).
94. Cowley v. Anderson, 159 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1947) (exclusive sales
agency); Shelnor Prod. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1930)
(attorney); Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Gamlen, 79 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa.
1948) (corporate officer and director); Mitchell Metal Prod. v. Berkeley
Equipment Co., 36 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Pa. 1941) (independent contractor
hired to develop an idea); Fairchild Engine & Airpline Corp. v. Cox, 50
N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1944) (officer and director).
95. To protect his secret information from visitors, the businessman
should either prevent the visitors from viewing the secret information or
should establish a contractual relationship with them. See, e.g., Cloud v.
Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1967). Of course, if the
visitor obtains the information by industrial espionage, such as theft, he
will be liable to the owner for damages and also be obligated to maintain
the confidential nature of the information. See, e.g., Sandler v. Gordon, 210
P.2d 314 (Cal. 1949); Dior v. Milton, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1956);
Eastern Extracting Co. v. Greater New York Extracting Co, 110 N.Y.S. 738
(1908).
96. Contra, Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 814 S.W.2d 763 (1958);
K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314
S.W.2d 782 (1958).
97. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prod., Inc., 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956).
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person and the person who induced the disclosure, 8 and return
or destruction of materials embodying the trade secret.9 9 Very
few jurisdictions have statutes making the betrayal of a trade
secret or inducement thereof a crime. In certain cases of industrial espionage, however, the manner in which the trade
secret is obtained may result in criminal sanctions.100 In actions
to protect secret information or to recover for its betrayal, most
jurisdictions have provisions for in camera proceedings to protect against a publication of the trade secret and thereby losing it.
Although the Sears and Compco decisions did not involve
secret information, some of the Court's broad statements immediately precipitated much agonizing as to whether the law
of unfair competition protecting secret information had been displaced. As the various federal and state courts grappled with
the problem, it became apparent that generally it had not been
displaced. The United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that Sears merely held that states cannot, under the
guise of regulating unfair competition, grant what is in effect
patent protection. To the extent that one makes out a breach
of confidence case against an individual defendant, he is not
seeking patent protection, that is, protection against the world,
but only a tort or contract remedy against an individual wrongdoer.'' The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the situation in which a defendant hired an employee
of, the plaintiff to take advantage of the employee's expertise
in reproducing a complicated system first developed by the
plaintiff. Recovery was allowed. The court stated that Sears
and Compco did not involve trade secrets and did not displace
10 2
the law of trade secrets.
98. A. H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prod. Corp., 268 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. N.Y.
1967). Contra, see notes 127 and 151 infra.
99. Gronemeyer v. Hunter Mfg. Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 1, 101 A.2d 489 (1954),
allowed election between destruction and a money judgment for the fair
value of the material.
100. New York and New Jersey have such penal provisions with respect
to trade secrets (misdemeanor).
101. Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965). See also Servo Corp. of America v.
General Electric Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934
(1966); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill.2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (Ill. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966).
102. Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F. 2d 163, 171 (5th
Cir. 1969).
The broadest extension of Sears and Compco was provided by the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case involving former employees
who were using and disclosing their ex-employer's secret information.
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Although the post-Sears and Compco decisions by the various
federal and state courts had begun to assuage the fears of those
attempting to protect secret information, the Supreme Court's
1969 decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins °" caused a resurgence of
the fears. Adkins had been hired by Lear for the purpose of
solving a problem relating to gyroscopes. Adkins promised to
grant Lear a license as to all ideas he might develop on a
mutually satisfactory royalty basis. As his ideas gained fruition,
Adkins filed a patent application and negotiated an agreement
with Lear under the conditions of which Lear promised to pay
royalties for Adkins' improvements. Lear commenced paying
royalties to Adkins, but prior to Adkins' obtaining a patent on
his improvements, Lear unilaterally decided that the improvements did not constitute patentable invention and thus quit
paying the royalties. Subsequently the Patent Office determined
that the improvements did constitute invention and issued the
patent. The main issue of the case turned on whether the
doctrine of licensee estoppel would preclude Lear from attacking
the validity of Adkins' patent. The Supreme Court expressly
overruled the doctrine of licensee estoppel, holding that it must
give way before the demands of the public interest.
The Court then examined the question of royalties, stating
that at the core of this question is the difficult determination of
whether federal patent policy bars a state from enforcing a
Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134
(9th Cir. 1965). The Ninth Circuit examined the policy considerations involved in deciding what limitations should be imposed upon an employee
In the use and disclosure of information acquired in the course of a terminated employment relationship or, conversely, what protection should be
extended to the former employer against the use and disclosure of such
information. One of the considerations advanced for protecting the employer's confidential, but unpatented, information was that the results of
research and development must be afforded reasonable protection from
disclosure or private Investment In such area will be slowed, with consequent
loss to both employers and public. The employer argued that the patent
laws do not afford adequate protection because excessive time is required
to process a patent application and because a high standard of invention
must be met to obtain a patent or at least to sustain a patent once Issued.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, however, stating that "[tihe
rationale of Sears . . . precludes judicial recognition of a legally protectible
interest In the secrecy of industrial Information as such, as distinguished
from an Interest in the integrity of confidential employer-employee relationships." Id. at 138. Turning to the facts of the case and finding a confidential employer-employee relationship, the Ninth Court held that the
employer was entitled to protection by injunctive relief against substantial
duplication of its trade secrets by its former employees and their new
employer.
103. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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contract regulating access to an unpatented secret idea. The
Court rejected Adkins' argument that Lear was controlled by
the terms of the contract. The Court stated:
"The parties' contract, however, is no more controlling
on this issue than is the State's doctrine of estoppel, which
is also rooted in contract principles. The decisive question
is whether overriding federal policies would be significantly
frustrated if licensees could be required to continue to pay
royalties during the time they are challenging patent validity in the courts."'1 4
The Court held, for reasons of overriding federal public policy,
that Lear must be permitted to avoid the payment of all royalties
accruing after the patent issued if Lear could prove patent invalidity.
The only issue left for the Court was whether Adkins
was entitled to the royalties due him from the date he conceived
his secret improvements until they were disclosed in the issued
patent. This issue had not been addressed by the California
Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court declined
to consider the matter, stating:
"[W]e have concluded, after much consideration, that even
though an important question of federal law underlies this
phase of the controversy, we should not now attempt to
define in even a limited way the extent, if any, to which the
States may properly act to enforce the contractual rights of
inventors of unpatented secret ideas."'' 5 (Emphasis added.)
In remanding the matter to the California Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court stated that its decision would
require the states to reconsider the theoretical basis of their
decisions enforcing the contractual rights of inventors and the
protections to be afforded in the future to secret information.
Perhaps the most ominous aspect of Lear appeared in the
dissent. Justice Black, speaking for himself, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Douglas, stated:
"I still entertain the belief I expressed for the Court in
Stiffel and Compco that no State has a right to authorize any
104. Id. at 673.
105. Id. at 675.
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kind of monopoly on what is claimed to be a new invention,
except when a patent has been obtained from the Patent
Office under the exacting standards of the patent laws. One
who makes a discovery may, of course, keep it secret if he
wishes, but private arrangements under which self-styled
'inventors' do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather
disclose them, in return for contractual payments, run
counter to the plan of our patent laws, which tightly regulate
the kind of inventions that may be protected and the manner in which they may be protected. The national policy
expressed in the patent laws, favoring free competition and
narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private
agreements among individuals,with or without the approval
(Emphasis added.)
of the State."'
Various state and federal courts are now engaged in re-examining the theoretical basis of their decisions protecting confidential information. One of the first re-examinations occurred in
Painton& Co. v. Bourns, Inc.107 Painton manufactured electronic

components under a contract with Bourns, which provided that
Painton would receive secret information, drawings, and engineering assistance and would be obligated to pay specified royalties on components incorporating such data. When the contract
expired, Painton refused to return the secret information to
Bourns, refused to cease using it, and refused to pay any more
royalties.
The district court noted that California law was applicable
to construe the contract, but held that the state law must obey
the dictates of the supremacy clause and thus yield to the
federal policies enunciated in Sears and Compco. Concerning
the components which were covered only by trade secrets, the
court followed the dissent of Mr. Justice Black in Lear and
refused to enforce the terms of the contract, stating "the federal
patent law requires an inventor to submit his ideas to the Patent
Office before he can compel consideration for the use of his
idea."' 8 The district court did not decide whether, under Cali106. Id. at 677.
107. 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
108. Id. at 274. The district court also held that the trade secret agreement could not be enforced in respect to those components covered by an
existing British patent. "Once a patent issues, regardless of what was the
intention of the contracting parties, the patentee-licensor may not enforce
Its trade secret claims .. . ." Id. at 273.
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fornia law, an inventor, if he makes a patent application, can
be compensated for his disclosure before the patent has issued.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed as unsound in law Painton's holding that trade secret
agreements are contrary to public policy. 0 9 As to whether an
agreement requiring payment for trade secrets is invalid under
the rationale of Sears, the Second Circuit noted that in Sears
the state law was conferring a monopoly against copying an
article otherwise in the public domain. But an agreement licensing a trade secret is an altogether different matter. It binds no
one except the licensee; all others are free, as the licensee previously was, to attempt by fair means to figure out what the
secret is and, if they succeed, to practice it. Rather than having
a monopolistic tendency, the upholding of private agreements
for the sharing of trade secrets on mutually acceptable terms
tends against the owner's hording them." 0
The reasoning of Judge Friendly was logical and correct:
"We therefore do not find, either in general considerations of public policy or in emanations from the federal
patent law, a sufficient basis for declining to enforce even
the royalty provisions of trade secret agreements, at least
with respect to cases where no patent application has been
filed. Whatever the impact of Lear may be with respect to
agreements governing inventions for which patent applications have been filed, we find no suggestion in the opinion
that the Court intended to cast doubt on the long-standing
principle that an inventor who chooses to exploit his invention by private arrangements is entirely free to do so, though
in so doing he may thereby forfeit his right to a patent.
Although the Court stated that 'federal law requires that
all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common
good unless they are protected by a valid patent,'

. . .

it did

not say or suggest that federal law requires that all ideas
must be put in general circulation.... In thousands of con-

tracts businessmen have divulged such secrets to competitors, dealing at arms' length and well able to protect them109. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Mr. 1971).
110. Id. at 223. The Second Circuit also refuted the district court's
theory that the protecting of trade secrets in advance of the filing of a
patent application discourages the filing of such applications and is against
the public interest. Id. at 223-25.
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selves, on the faith that mutually acceptable provisions for
payment, for the preservation of confidentiality, and for the
return of the secret information on termination or default
will be enforced by the courts. Provisions against competition not utilizing the trade secret, after expiration of the
agreement, are a different matter which must be judged
on their own facts. The district judge cited no data to prove
that licensing of trade secrets had worked adversely to the
public interest. To the contrary, such facts as have been
brought to our notice indicate that the sharing of technological know-how on the basis of proper agreements has
been beneficial not only within this country but in its relations with others. In the absence of empirical evidence of
harm, a settled rule of contract law on which so much has
been staked should not be overturned save on a clear showing that it is inconsistent with other rules of higher sanction
or that the conditions that gave it birth no longer prevail.
There has been no such showing here.""'1 (Emphasis added.)
Other post-Lear decisions show no inclination to change the
traditional common law concepts protecting secret information
against misappropriation, breach of contract or breach of confidence. For instance the United States Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has upheld a preliminary injunction restraining an
employee and his conspirators from exploiting and misusing
his ex-employer's trade secrets, stating:
"And although [the employee] himself may have developed
some of the secrets, he gave [his employer] a written covenant not to use or disclose them, and this covenant also
extends to those whom the Court held were conspirators ....
Nor do the Sears-Compco rules prevent equitable relief for
the misuse of trade secrets by those who are bound by a
confidential relationship or by an express or implied agree112
ment to maintain secrecy."
111. Id. at 225-226.
112. Dekar Industries, Inc. v. Bisseft-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304, 1306
(9th Cir. 1970). In providing protection to an employer's trade secrets, the
Ninth Circuit cited the pre-Lear decisions of Winston Research Corp. V.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. C^,., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965), and Servo Corp.
of America v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964).
See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1971) and
422 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1970), a post-Lear trade secret case decided by the
Fifth Circuit. Although it was ultimately held that the subject matter did
not constitute a protectible trade secret because it did not possess at least
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Post-Lear decisions of course continue to apply the Sears
and Compco doctrine strenuously to situations in which the owner
voluntarily or negligently discloses his secret information. In
such cases, the competitor may lawfully reverse engineer the
finished product or slavishly copy it. n1
LOUISIANA LAW PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

The proper beginning for an inquiry into the protections
afforded confidential information by the Louisiana law is to
examine the Louisiana Constitution, statutes, and code provisions.1 14 The Louisiana Legislature has made it amply clear that
it does not condone unfair competition. It has enacted legislation
dealing with trademarks and trade names,"15 unfair discrimination in trade,"16 endless chains,1 17 willingly and knowingly advertising commodities at less than stipulated minimum prices," s and
false advertising. 119 Although there is little express legislation
concerning the protection of confidential information, there is
a modicum of originality to separate it from every day knowledge, the
Fifth Circuit cited its pre-Lear decision, Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco
Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969), for the conclusion that trade
secrets are protected against inequitable use by another, such as, by a
breach of contract, abuse of confidence, or impropriety in obtaining the
secrets.
See also E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012
(5th Cir. 1970). The defendants flew over the plaintiff's plant as it was
being constructed and took aerial photographs. Plaintiff contended that
the defendants had wrongfully appropriated its trade secrets. The Fifth
Circuit divined that under Texas law one may use his competitor's secret
process if he discovers it by reverse engineering applied to the finished
product, or if he discovers it by his own independent research, but he may
not avoid these labors by taking the process from the discoverer without
his permission at a time when the discoverer is taking reasonable precautions to maintain its secrecy. Thus, the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's holding that, in Texas, aerial
photography of plant construction which is being maintained in secrecy is
an improper means of obtaining another's trade secret. Neither Lear nor
Sears nor Compco was cited.
113. See, e.g., Marcus Advertising, Inc. v. M. M. Fisher Associates, Inc.,
444 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1971) (the defendant could lawfully copy an advertising slogan that had been in the public domain for three years); Lemelson
v. Kellogg Co., 440 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1971) (the defendant could lawfully
copy plaintiff's art work for its cereal boxes because the art work had been
made public by the issuance of a copyright, copyright infringement not
being in issue); and Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 435 F.2d 711
(9th Cir. 1970) (the defendant was allowed to copy the style of Nancy
Sinatra's singing of the song "Boots").
114. LA. Crv. CoDm art. 1.
115. LA.R.S. 51:211-288 (1950).
116. Id. § 331-337.
117. Id. Hi 361-371.
118. Id. §§391-396.
119. Id. §§ 411-412.
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ample evidence that the legislature recognizes the existence
of trade secrets. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides
for the protection of secret processes, developments and research
during the taking of depositions. 120 And provisions have been
made for the protection of the trade secrets of others uncovered
by certain administrative bodies in their investigations. 12 1
There have not been many opportunities for the Louisiana
judiciary to develop a broad body of law concerning unfair competition. In the cases that have arisen, the Louisiana courts,
quoting liberally from legal encyclopedias, the works of commentators, and the decisions of other jurisdictions, generally
have applied the legal principles extant throughout the United
States and condemned those acts which have been prohibited in
122
other states.
Particularly, palming-off has been condemned. 12 Protection
has been provided to a businessman's trade names, trademark,
service mark, and distinctive appearance against confusing
similar imitations.124 A notable difference developed by the Louisiana courts in this area is that, insofar as a trade name is
concerned, the plaintiff has been required to show both unfairness and fraud on the part of the defendant before he can obtain
injunctive relief.-25 The solicitation of an employer's customers
120. LA. CODE Civ. P art. 1452.
121. See, e.g., LA.R.S. 40:636(6) (1950); Id. § 1033(7); and id. 51:1058(b).
122. Various federal courts attempting to divine the Louisiana law of
unfair competition have noted that the Louisiana law follows the law of
unfair competition as recognized generally. See, e.g., Great Lakes Carbon
Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 219 F. Supp. 468, 497 (W.D. La. 1963); Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of America v. Guardian Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 851
(E.D.
1960).
123.La.
Smithwick
v. Lorants Army & Sporting Goods, Inc., 153 So.2d 196
(La. App. 2d Cir.), w4t denied, 244 La. 1001, 156 So.2d 56 (1963) (judgment
correct).
124. See, e.g., New Orleans Checker Cabs, Inc. v. Mumphrey, 205 La.
1083, 18 So.2d 629 (1944); Albrecht v. Del Bondio, 188 La. 502, 177 So. 587
(1937); Marcev v. Mandich, 158 La. 15, 103 So. 389 (1925); Yellow Cab Co. v.
Jones, 156 La. 837, 101 So. 216 (1924); Huth v. Rosenzweig, 27 So.2d 742 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1946). See also Trappey v. Mcflhenney Co., 281 F. 23 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 260 U.S. 733 (1922) (involving the mark "Tobasco").
125. See, e.g., Straus Frank Co. v. Brown, 246 La. 999, 169 So.2d 77 (1964);
IHome Beverage Serv. v. Baas, 210 La. 873, 28 So.2d 481 (1946). It is suggested once it Is determined that the plaintiff has used the trade name in
connection with his goods or services or business and has obtained rights
therein and that the defendant's use of a trade name, trademark or service
mark Is confusingly similar thereto, the defendant's lack of fraud should
be relevant only for the mitigation of damages. Injunctive relief Is designed
to prevent further injury to the plaintiff's rights and to protect the public,
and should not be governed by the fraud or lack thereof on the part of the
defendant.
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by the employee for his new competing business prior to termination of the employment relationship has been held to be an
act of unfair competition.'-' Unfortunately, the Louisiana courts
have consistently held, contrary to all other states, that one has
no action ex delicto against another for inducing a breach of
contract. 127 However, these decisions have indicated that a cause
of action ex contractu may be proper under certain circumstances.
Since the Louisiana courts have generally applied the common law principles recognized in other states to other questions
of unfair competition, it is logical to assume they would also
apply many of the common law protections afforded by the
various states to a Louisiana businessman's confidential information-unless such an application would conflict with an express
Louisiana statute or a strong, overriding public policy. This
assumption is supported by the relatively few reported decisions
in Louisiana dealing with a businessman's confidential information.
1 28
In Marcann Outdoor, Inc. v. Johnston,'
the defendant had
developed unique, secret formulae and processes for photographic
emulsion. The court found that the information constituted a
"valuable trade-secret property."'129 The defendant sold these
trade secrets, as well as any future developments to these
processes, to the plaintiff. Subsequently, the defendant sought
employment with one of plaintiff's principal competitors and
threatened to disclose the secrets to the competitor. Plaintiff
sought an injunction prohibiting the defendant from making,
using, selling or disclosing all or any portion of the formulae
and processes as well as future developments.

Without citing any Louisiana case directly in point, the
court held "there is little question but that Marcann is entitled
126. Servisco v. Morreale, 312 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. La. 1970).
127. See, e.g., Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 8 So.2d 361 (1942); Moulin
v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927); Roussell Pump & Elec. Co. v.
Sanderson, 216 So.2d 650 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969). See also Note, 30 IA. L.
Rmv. 713 (1970). Due to the harshness of this doctrine, the Louisiana courts
may develop a theory of recovery for inducement of a breach of contract
based on the right of privacy. See Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 245 La. 84, 157 So.2d 231 (1963); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1968-1964 Term-Torts, 25 LA. L. Rnv. 334, 341-46
(1965).
128. 229 So.2d 419 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
129. Id, at 420.
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to injunctive relief to protect the valuable trade-secret industrial
property purchased by it."1"* The only problem in the minds
of the court was the breadth of the injunction. Since the defendant could cite no authority invalidating the sale to the plaintiff of the future developments in the processes, the court concluded that the terms of the injunction should include the future
developments.
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal arrived at
a correct result by applying ordinary property and contract
concepts to secret information. Since the defendant had sold his
secret incorporeal property to the plaintiff, the law should not
permit him to use it himself or disclose it to others until the
information otherwise becomes publicly known.
In Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 1 the
court considered a charge of misappropriation of trade secrets
which had been joined with a substantial and related claim
under the patent laws. Commenting that Louisiana follows the
law of unfair competition as recognized generally, the court
stated that the essential elements of a cause of action for breach
of confidence relating to secret information are: (a) possession
by the plaintiff of knowledge or information which is not generally known; (b) communication of this knowledge or information by the plaintiff to the defendant under an express or implied
agreement limiting its use or disclosure by the defendant; and
(c) use or disclosure by the defendant of the knowledge or
information so obtained in violation of the contract or confidence, to, the injury of the plaintiff. The court found that all
of the alleged secret information was described in issued United
States patents and was therefore publicly known. Since proof
of the existence of a trade secret is essential to a claim of misappropriation of a trade secret, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed.
The test applied in Great Lakes was based on contractual or
fiduciary obligations and made no reference to property concepts.
It was expressly followed in Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle,13 2 but
again plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed because the
information sought to be protected was not in fact secret. Al130. Id.
131. 219 F. Supp. 468 (W.D. La. 1963), aff1', 345 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1965).
132. 317 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. La. 1970).
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though the plaintiff may have had the intent to keep the processes and the machinery secret, he had not exercised any secrecy
precautions. The court found that the guardhouses were unmanned and no admission restrictions were enforced on the
premises. Customers, independent contractors, repairmen, engineers and other professionals were allowed to stroll about in
the area where the alleged secret processes were being conducted. Additionally, an annual report of the plaintiff published
a photograph of the heat treating equipment alleged to be a
secret.l8 3
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe13 4 considered an agreement
under the terms of which Zumpe had agreed not to use or
disclose at any time after the termination of his employment
any of his employer's confidential information. The court determined that certain valuable information, not readily available
elsewhere, had been disclosed to Zumpe in confidence and,
irrespective whether the information was technically a "trade
secret" under some definitions, if Zumpe disclosed it to another
he would violate his contract.
Brown & Root, Inc. v. LeBauve'3 5 was concerned with the
situation where an employee, upon obtaining a compilation of
information from his employer which gave him an opportunity
to gain an advantage over other businessmen (even though
each individual piece of the information could have been found
in the public domain), resigned and took steps to induce his
ex-employer's principal to deal with him rather than his
ex-employer. The court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction stating that a fiduciary or trust relationship existed
between the defendant and the plaintiff, a relationship of mutual
confidence which obliged the defendant to work in the interest
of the plaintiff to the ultimate end of fulfilling its contract.
"To permit defendant to now capitalize on the information and knowledge he has gained while in the employ of
133. The plaintiff argued that its employment agreement with the
employee acknowledged that the process was a secret. Judge Dawkins
stated that while the agreement must be given some weight in the determination of the existence of a confidential relationship, it is not conclusive of
the issue. "[1It is a function of the court ... not the employee to determine
whether a trade secret so-called and considered by the employee is actually
such." 317 F. Supp. at 638.
134. 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967).

135. 219

F.

Supp. 179 (W.D. La. 1962), aoff'd, 319 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1963).
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plaintiff at a time when the end product of his employment
comes into fruition, is repugnant to the nature of the engagement entered into by him with his employer. The fiduciary
relationship continues even after termination of the employment ...."1,6
These decisions indicate that the state and federal courts in
Louisiana will rely on the same concepts utilized by courts in
other states to provide protection for secret information. The
courts will examine the facts of each case to determine if there
exists an express or implied contractual or confidential relationship between the parties imposing an obligation on one not to
use or disclose the other's secret information. In the absence
of such a relationship, the facts will be examined to determine
if one party unlawfully or unfairly misappropriated another's
secret information property. If either of these situations exists,
there is a legal basis for affording relief to the owner of the
secret information.
Affording protection to a businessman's secret information
on the basis of breach of contract or breach of confidence, however, often requires a balancing of the businessman's interest
against the Louisiana public policy of free competition. 187 The
problem is augmented in many instances by the existence of a
non-competition agreement, 188 which must be reconciled with
the strong Louisiana policy embodied in R.S. 23:921.139 Under
136. Id. at 180.
137. See, e.g., Jones v. Ernst & Ernst, 172 La. 406, 184 So. 375 (1931);
Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1926); Lewis v. HuieHodge Lumber Co., 121 La. 658, 46 So. 685 (1908); Marine Forwarding &
Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So.2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Bogalusa
Ice Co. v. Moffett, 179 So. 327 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
138. One of the implied terms of a contract of employment is that the
employee will not use or disclose his employer's secret information learned
during his employment. But since it may be difficult to determine what is
secret information, the covenant not to compete has grown up as a practical
solution to the problem of protecting confidential information. See Water

Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 171 (5th Cir. 1969).
139. LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 104, provides:
"No employer shall require or direct any employee to enter into any
contract whereby the employee agrees not to engage in any competing business for himself, or as the employee of another, upon the termination of his

contract of employment with such employer, and all such contracts, or provisions thereof containing such agreement shall be null and unenforceable

in any court, provided that in those cases where the employer incurs an
expense in the training of the employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business that the employer is engaged in, then in that
event it shall be permissible for the employer and employee to enter into a
voluntary contract and agreement whereby the employee is permitted to
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the common law of the various states, the legality of a covenant
not to compete is governed by the reasonableness of the terms
and conditions of the covenant. Although the Louisiana courts
have followed the doctrine of reasonableness in non-competition
agreements ancillary to the sale of the goodwill of the business, 14
R.S. 23:921 rejects this doctrine as concerns restrictive covenants
ancillary to employment contracts.
In other jurisdictions, an action for breach of a covenant
not to compete and an action for misappropriation -of a trade
secret by a breach of a confidential or contractual relationship
are independent actions. 141 The actions are often related because
an employer has a legitimate interest in protecting a trade
secret by means of a restrictive covenant. The existence of the
trade secret also bears on the reasonableness of the restraints
imposed on the employee by the covenant. However, an employer may elect not to require his employees to execute a noncompetition agreement and may nevertheless indefinitely prevent
his ex-employees from using or disclosing secret information
they learned from him during their employment. The federal
and state decisions which have struggled with the confrontation
in Louisiana of the businessman's interest in protecting his
secret information and the public policy of free competition
appear to be developing a similar doctrine.
On at least two occasions, courts in Louisiana have been
able to address the problem of balancing the businessman's interest in protecting his confidential information against another's
interest in free competition unfettered by an express non-competition agreement or any demands that the other party be
enjoined from working for a competitor, soliciting customers
agree and bind himself that at the termination of his or her employment
that said employee will not enter into the same business that employer is
engaged over the same route or in the same territory for a period of two
years."

The judicial foundation of LA. R.S. 23:921 was indeed shaky. The early
decisions voided restrictive covenants ancillary to employment contracts on
the theory that they constituted potestative conditions. Blanchard v. Haber,
166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928); Cloverland Dairy Prod. Co. v. Grace, 180
La. 694, 157 So. 393 (1934). This reasoning was later rejected by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Serv.,
221 La. 677, 60 So.2d 83 (1952), but not until after the result of the earlier
decisions had been embodied in LA. R.S. 23:921.

140. See, e.g., Moorman & Givens v. P!arkerson, 127 La, 835, 54 So. 47
(1911).

141. See, e.g., Water Serv., Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 171
(5th Cir. 1969).
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or the like. In these cases, Marcann142 and Brown & Root,1' the
plaintiff was seeking only an injunction prohibiting the defendant
from using or disclosing his confidential information. In both
cases the defendant argued that simply prohibiting him from
using plaintiff's confidential information impaired his ability to
compete with the plaintiff and violated the Louisiana public
policy of free competition. The defendant in Brown & Root
expressly raised the provisions of R.S. 23:921. The court in each
case rejected this argument and held that the defendant was
not prohibited from engaging in a competitive business, he was
simply prohibited from using or disclosing plaintiff's confidential
information.
A much more difficult question would have been presented
if the plaintiff had proven the defendant's employment with
another would inevitably result in the use or disclosure of plaintiff's confidential information and, even though lacking an express non-competition agreement, had demanded that the defendant be enjoined from such employment. This issue was
raised in Standard Brands1T where the employer sought to enjoin his former employee from working for a competitor and
from disclosing confidential information and trade secrets learned
during his employment. Zumpe had not signed a non-competition agreement, but he had agreed not to disclose or use at any
time after the termination of his employment any of his employer's confidential information.
The court examined the Louisiana law to determine whether
an injunction should issue prohibiting Zumpe from working
for his new employer in any capacity involving responsibility
for the production of instant tea or coffee. After examining the
history of R.S. 23:921, the court concluded that there can be
little doubt that Louisiana courts would in a proper case enjoin
the disclosure of trade secrets in violation of a fiduciary or contractual obligation to maintain their secrecy. However, that does
not mean that Louisiana would sanction an injunction against
working for a competitor because the new job entails the possible
disclosure of trade secrets.
142. 229 So.2d 419 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
143. 219 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. La. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1963).
144. 264 F.Supp. 254 (E.D. Le. 1967).

1972] PROTECTION OFPROPRIETARY INFORMATION

533

"While it does not appear here that the disclosure of confidential information by Mr. Zumpe will inevitably result
from his employment by Reily, even if this were the consequence, no remedy could be afforded. For Louisiana has
made a legislative determination, binding on this court as
it is on the courts of Louisiana, that prevents enforcement
even of an express covenant not to compete, let alone an
implied obligation not to do so. If this imperils the ability
of manufacturers having plants in Louisiana to insulate their
trade secrets, that is the result of Louisiana's policy to protect the employee from what it considers to be an improper
bargain even where he has expressly covenanted not to
compete. '1 45 (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff had presented no evidence that it met the expense
and advertisement exceptions of R.S. 23:921.
The court also considered whether an injunction should
issue preventing disclosure of the plaintiff's confidential information by Zumpe while in the employ of Reily. The court concluded that the issuance of an injunction is not justified by the
mere fact that irreparable harm may possibly ensue if restraint
is not imposed. Rather, the plaintiff must make out a case for the
issuance of the injunction by demonstrating that there is a clear
and present need for it. The court stated its holding was not
influenced by the existence of an express agreement between
the parties; the same duties would have been imposed upon
Zumpe under the law.
In most of the Louisiana cases involving the problem of
confidential information, however, the plaintiff's demand for
protection of his confidential information has been coupled with
a demand that the defendant be enjoined from performing some
activity expressly prohibited by an employment agreement. Each
of these decisions necessarily involved consideration of R.S.
23:921. An orderly examination of these decisions should commence with Martin-Parry v. New Orleans Fire Detection Service,14 6 a Louisiana Supreme Court decision not involving secret
information. The parties had entered into an employment agreement in which the employee agreed that for a period of two
years after his employment terminated he would not disturb,
145. Id. at 265-66.
146. 221 La. 677, 60 So.2d 83 (1952).
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hire, entice away, or in any other manner persuade any employee
or dealer of his ex-employer to discontinue his employment relationship. The supreme court found that this was a perfectly
lawful promise based on reasonable grounds and supported by
valuable consideration. It did not violate the provisions of R.S.
23:921 because it did not prevent the ex-employee from engaging
in a competitive business. It simply protected the ex-employer
against having his other employees enticed away.
National Motor Club, Inc. v. Conque,147 considered an employment agreement which contained a covenant not to compete
for five years from the date the employment terminated and a
clause whereby the employee agreed not to attempt to sell
competing memberships to the company's customers after his
employment terminated. The district court reformed the covenant not to compete by enjoining the defendant from selling
automobile insurance for a period of two years from the date
his employment terminated. The court of appeal held that this
injunction effectively prohibited the defendant from earning a
livelihood in the field of his experience and thus was governed
by the provisions of R.S. 23:921. The facts surrounding the
employment were examined and found not to fall within the
limited exceptions permitted by R.S. 23:921, and thus the covenant was declared invalid.
Concerning the agreement not to sell competing memberships to the company's customers, the company argued that the
clause was lawful under the holding of Martin-Parry. The court
of appeal rejected this argument stating that the clause in
Martin-Parry protected the employer against raids of his staff
and dealerships. A covenant not to sell to the company's customers, on the other hand, effectively requires one not to engage
in a competing business and thus is not lawful under R.S. 23:921
unless supported by valid training and advertising expenses.
In Delta Finance Co. v. Graves,'14 the employer sued his exemployee and a third party under the terms of his ex-employee's
employment contract. The employment contract provided that
if, after the termination of his employment, the employee should
go into a same or similar business, he would not: (a) solicit
147. 173 So.2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cr.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So.2d
110 (1965).
148. 180 So.2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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any active or paid out customers of the company; (b) pay off
or make payments on any active customer's accounts of the
company; (c) transmit or reveal any information, written or
oral, concerning the active or paid out accounts of the company
or methods of operation or types of business forms of the company to a competitor or use the same for himself or others in the
same or similar employment; and (d) publish his photograph
or cause it to be published or allow it to be published or use his
name or advertising in conjunction with the same or similar
employment.
The court of appeal examined the history of R.S. 23:921 and
the judicial interpretations thereof, including National Motor
Club of Louisiana,Inc. v. Conque, and concluded that, by amending R.S. 23:921, the legislature:
"[r]emoved the broad injunction against noncompeting contracts as being contrary to public policy. The statute as
presently written gives approval to general non-competitive
contracts meeting the requirements of the 1962 amendment,
and in so doing, places such agreements beyond condemnation of public policy. A fortiori, contractual provisions which
merely restrict the employee's activity as to certain particulars of the employer's business should be respected."'149 (Emphasis added.)
The court distinguished the contract from that in National
Motor Club, Inc. v. Conque: "The effect of these provisions is
to prohibit Graves from pirating or taking direct steps to secure
and injure the business of the former employer, Delta. It does
not prevent him from utilizing his training or competing with
other similar business.' '15o The case was remanded for determination of damages and injunctive relief against the ex-employee. 151
The Martin-Parry and Delta Finance doctrine that neither
Louisiana public policy nor R.S. 23:921 prohibits an employee
from agreeing that, upon termination of his employment, he will
not pirate or take direct steps to injure his ex-employer's busi149. Id. at 88.
150. Id. at 88-89.
151. Interestingly, as concerns the alleged third party co-conspirator, the
matter was dismissed under the existing Louisiana theory that "Eojne not
a party to a contract is not liable in damages to one of the parties to the
contract for inducing the other party to breach the contract." 180 So.2d at 89.
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ness, has been followed in later decisions. 52 A particular problem, however, has arisen in determining whether such an agreement will be enforced insofar as it obligates the ex-employee
to refrain from using a confidential customer list or soliciting the
employer's customers.
Under the common law of the various states, an employee
may be prevented from soliciting his employer's customers,
even in the absence of an express agreement, if he made a list
of the names of the customers while in the employment relationship. But he cannot be so prevented, in the absence of an express
agreement, if he committed the names of the customers to
memory. On at least one occasion this latter principle was
applied in Louisiana to a situation in which an employer, having
no express agreement with his ex-employee, sought to enjoin
his ex-employee from using names of customers obtained during
the employment and from soliciting those customers. The court
found that the names of the customers were lawfully learned
by the employee while employed and were part of his memory
and knowledge. Thus the customers could be freely solicited
by the ex-employee. 1'
It is questionable whether the former
principle will be adopted at all in Louisiana as the courts have
been very cautious about enforcing even express agreements
not to solicit customers. Although Delta Finance'5 4 and Buckeye
Garment Rental Co. v. Jones'55 enforced agreements prohibiting
an employee from soliciting his ex-employer's customers, National Motor Club'5 and Servisco v. Morreale'5 refused to enforce similar agreements because they in effect prevented the
ex-employee from engaging in a competing business. As both
Buckeye and Servisco were decided by the same judge, it is
quite obvious that these determinations shall be made on a caseby-case basis with the interests of the parties involved carefully weighed against each other.
152. See Buckeye Garment Rental Co. v. Jones, 276 F. Supp. 560 (EfD.
La. 1967); Bookkeepers Business Serv., Inc. v. Davis, 208 So.2d 1 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968).
153. See Theater Time Clock, Inc. v. Stewart, 276 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. La.
1967). See also Baton Rouge Cigarette Serv. v. Bloomenstiel, 88 So.2d 742
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1956). Cf. Servisco v. Morreale, 312 F. Supp. 103, 106 (E.D.
La. 1970); Brown & Root, Inc. v. LaBauve, 219 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. La. 1962),
ar, d, 319 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1963).
154. 180 So.2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
155. 276 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1967).
156. 173 So.2d_238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So.2d
110 (1965).
157. 312 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. La. 1970).
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The courts in Louisiana generally are correctly correlating
the interests businessmen have in their secret information with
the public interests in free competition. One who obtains another's secret information unlawfully or in breach of a contract
or a confidence should be prohibited from using or disclosing
the information. He should not be enjoined from engaging in
competitive activities (as that term has been judicially defined)
however, unless he is a former employee of the owner of the
information and the owner meets the requirements of R.S. 23:921,
or it is inevitable that he will use or disclose the secret information while engaged in such competitive activities. In this connection, it is suggested that the court's statement in Standard
Brands concerning the effect of R.S. 23:921 was unnecessarily
broad. The court had already determined that it was not inevitable that Zumpe would use or disclose his former employer's
secret information and that if Zumpe did disclose the secrets to
his new employer and he used them, it was inevitable that
Zumpe's former employer could ascertain this fact and take
further action. This factual determination would have supported
the refusal to issue the injunction. It is also suggested that, as
indicated in Delta Finance, the legislative pronouncement in
R.S. 23:921 is not a general condemnation of all of the conflicting
rights of others. There should surely be instances when an
employer, to protect his valuable secret information, may obtain injunctive relief preventing his ex-employee from performing a type of work in which he will inevitably use or disclose such secrets.
Finally, since the purpose of injunctive relief is to preserve
the status quo, and in the case of secret information to preserve
the secret, if it appears there is any possibility the secret may
be used or disclosed by one who obtained the secret unlawfully
or in breach of a contract or a confidence, then the injunction
should issue. Failure to issue the injunction may result in the
secret information being injected into the public domain, leaving
the former owner of the information with only an action for
damages against the tortious or breaching party.
GUIDELINES

A businessman often faces problems pertaining to proprietary information and through ignorance or passiveness fails to
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take the steps necessary to protect himself and his information.
Thus a businessman wishing to protect his proprietary information should be versed in the law. He should establish certain standard operating procedures designed to protect his proprietary information under the law, and he should follow those
procedures energetically and diligently.
To protect himself, it is most important that the owner of
proprietary information strive in all cases to develop a contractual or confidential relationship with those to whom the
information will be disclosed. Preferably the relationship will
be governed by an express, written contract.158
One who develops or is continually developing proprietary
information is faced with a business decision as to how he should
best use and exploit it. If the information constitutes patentable
subject matter, meets the strict standards and conditions of the
Patent Act, and can be reverse-engineered by a competitor once
the product embodying the invention is placed on the market, the
businessman should consider applying for a patent on the information. A procedure should be developed for maintaining detailed, written records of the progress of the conception and
development of the information. Each entry in these records
should be dated and signed by at least one of the persons working
on the development of the information and another person not
related to the project. If the secrecy of the developed information is destroyed by the information being placed on sale or put
into public use in the United States, care must be taken to
ensure the patent application is filed within one year thereafter.
The businessman should be aware of the common law copyright protecting his unpublished "writings" and the simple precautions necessary to obtain statutory copyright when he publishes the writings. Writings which are original with the businessman, such as maps, plans and specifications, and which by
necessity are required to be published, should always bear the
requisite statutory notice when "published.' 15 9
158. See note 88 supra. The Louisiana courts look to the

allegations

and prayer of the petition to determine whether the action is ex contractu
or ex delicto for the purpose of determining the applicable prescription.
Importsales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 92 So.2d 574 (1957).
159. The statutory notice must be on the writing when it is originally
published. It is a crime to put the notice fraudulently on a writing which
has been previously published and is already in the public domain. 17 U.S.C.

§ 105 (1970).
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The businessman should be aware that any unpatented
product or uncopyrighted writing injected into the public domain by him can be slavishly copied by his competitor. The
law of unfair competition only limits the manner in which the
competitor can market the copied product.
The businessman should be especially alert in protecting
his proprietary information which either is not patentable or
copyrightable or is more valuable maintained in secrecy. All
persons with whom the businessman considers dealing should
be required to enter into an express contractual relationship
providing that all of his confidential information will be received
in confidence and will not be used or disclosed without his
written consent. All writings containing the businessman's confidential information should be marked with an obvious classification label, such as "CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION," and a statement that the information is the property of the businessman. 160
Steps should be taken to prevent visitors from having access
to the confidential information. If the information is embodied
in a visible apparatus, the area should be walled or sealed and
possibly guarded.'' Visitors requesting or having access to the
confidential information may be required to enter into an agree16 2
ment not to use or disclose such information.
The relationship between a businessman and his employees
is an extremely critical aspect of protecting secret information.
If business practices permit, the employer should enter into an
agreement with each of his employees requiring the disclosure
and assignment to the employer of all information, whether
patentable or not, developed during their employment. 16 In the
case where the employee was not hired to invent, an agreement
to this effect gives the employer ownership of the information
rather than a mere "shop right." If the employee was hired to
160. This can also give rise to certain implied obligations on the part
of one who inadvertently receives the writings.
161. See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle, 317 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. La. 1970).
162. E.g., In view of your request to visit our development laboratories
and examine the facilities, equipment and processes, it is desired that you
be advised that these are considered proprietary with respect to this
company.
By your signature at the bottom of this letter it is understood that you
agree not to use or disclose any of this information without our prior
written consent.
163. Although this provision merely restates to some extent the employee's obligations under the law, it has a favorable pyschological effect on
the employee.
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invent or write, the invention or "writing" belongs to the employer as a matter of law. The employee should agree to maintain the confidentiality of all of the employer's confidential
information and not to use or disclose the information during
the period of his employment or thereafter. 6 4 The employee
should agree not to take steps after the termination of his employment to injure his employer's business. The prohibited actions should be clearly enunciated and may include enticing
away or disturbing other employees and soliciting customers
with whom the employer has done business within a certain
period of time. And, of course, the employee may be requested
to agree not to compete for a period of two years. Since the
various provisions of the agreement will be enforced only if
they do not conflict with R.S. 23:921 or Louisiana public policy,
a severability clause definitely should be included in the agreement. 16 5

It is suggested that there be both a pre-employment and a
post-employment interview with each employee. In the preemployment interview, the policies of the employer with respect to his proprietary information should be explained and
the details of the agreement which the prospective employee
is expected to execute should be reviewed. The employee should
be cautioned that he is expected not to use or disclose any confidential information he learned from his prior employer. 1 6 At
the post-employment interview, the terminating employee should
be requested to submit in writing the details of all the proprietary information developed by him during his employment.
He should be advised of the obligations resulting from his employment that are continuing obligations. Assurances should
be obtained that the employee does not have any documents
or other property of the employer.
Businessmen sincerely interested in protecting secret information should carefully screen their prospective employees to
ensure they are not susceptible to industrial espionage. Information should be distributed throughout the organization only
on a need-to-know basis.
164. Contracting as to what will be considered confidential information

probably will not be considered binding by the courts. See Wheelabrator
Corp. v. Fogle, 317 F. Supp. 633, 638 (W.D. La. 1970).
165. Buckeye Garment Rental Co. v. Jones, 276 F. Supp. 560, 562 (E.D.
La. 1967).
166. This provision may even be Included as part of his employment
agreement.
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Lastly, a businessman should utilize what he has learned
about protecting his own proprietary information to avoid being
involved in a contractual or confidential relationship with another which restricts his operations. Care should be taken in
dealing with persons submitting unsolicited suggestions that no
confidential relationship arises. Unless the businessman is willing to risk not being able to use or disclose the information received or having to pay royalties to the solicitor, the information should not be accepted or examined until the solicitor has
agreed there is no obligation to keep the information confidential
or to refrain from freely using and disclosing it. 17 Care should
be taken in setting up contractual or confidential relationships
to limit the period of the obligation, as at least the Texas law
has on occasion resulted in a permanent injunction against one
using trade secrets in breach of the confidential relationship
even though the secret information had become a part of the
public domain.'8
In summary, the field of the law pertaining to proprietary
information, perhaps more so than most other areas of the law,
is responsive to socio-economic conditions. Additionally, particular attention has been focused on this field of law as a result
of the United States Supreme Court decision in Lear. However,
the resulting re-examination by the courts of our existing legal
systems providing protection to proprietary information is establishing that the systems are for the most part vital to the
orderly conduct of business, function to promote the progress
of science, and are not alien to the present socio-economic conditions of this country. A businessman should, therefore, not
be hesitant to pursue the protection of his valuable proprietary
information. He simply should be careful to conduct his activities in accordance with the law and respected business principles
so that problems concerning his proprietary information are
always in a posture which, while favorable to him, is not so
inequitable to others as to cause a court to alter the law.
167. In the case of a controversy between the parties, the businessman
may find himself forever precluded from using and disclosing the Information he received in confidence. The businessman will bear the burden of
proving he independently conceived the information.
168. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958); K & G
Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex 594, 314 S.W.2d
782 (1958).

